State v. Hergesheimer Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 41284 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-4-2014
State v. Hergesheimer Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41284
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Hergesheimer Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41284" (2014). Not Reported. 1564.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1564
IN THE SUPREME COURT, OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 





Supreme Court No. 41284 
No. CR-MD-2011-0014132 
FILED -COPY 
MAR - 6 2014 
Supreme Coort..-Court of ,wea!s 
Entered on ATS t'f 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada 
The Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge, Presiding 
Michael G. Brady, ISB #1293 
Eric D. Fredericksen, ISB #6555 
Brady Law, Chartered 
St. Mary's Crossing 
2537 West State Street, Suite 200 
Boise Idaho 83 702 
Phone: (208) 345-8400 
Fax: (208) 322-4486 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Idaho Attorney General's Office 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-00 l 0 
Phone: (208) 334-3545 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Tl\BLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE ................................................................................................................ 1 
A. Nature of the Case ............................................................................................................. 1 
B. Statement of the Facts and Course Proceedings ............................................................... 1 
ISSUES ............ . 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ . 
I. The Magistrate Erred When It Denied Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 Motion Seeking 
A Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To 
Establish The Corpus Deliciti Of The Charged Offense Independent Of 
Mr. Hergesheimer's Admission ............................................................................................... 5 
A. Introduction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
C. The Magistrate Erred When It Denied Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 Motion Seeking A 
Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish 
The Corpus Deliciti Of The Charged Offense Independent Of Mr. Hergesheimer's 
Admission. 
1. It Would Violate Constitutional Principles Of Due Process To Apply The 
Elimination Of The Corpus Delicti Requirement From The Opinion In Suriner To 
Mr. Hergesheimer's Case. 
2. Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 Motion Should Have Been Granted \Vhere The State 
Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish The Corpus Deliciti Of The Charged 
Offense Independent Of Mr. Hergesheimer's Admission ....................................... 14 
IL The Magistrate Erred In Denying Mr. Hergesheimer's Motion To Suppress 
Statements Obtained In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights ..................................... 16 
A. Introduction . ................................................................................................................... . 16 
-i-
12110001 
B. The Magistrate Erred In Denying Mr. Hergesheimer's Motion To Suppress Statements 
Obtained In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights ................................................. 17 
1. Mr. Hergesheimer Was In Custody For Purposes Of }vfiranda . .............................. 18 
2. Mr. Hergesheimer Was Not Properly Informed Of His Rights And His Statements 
Were Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary .................................................... .20 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 21 
CERTIFICi\TE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 22 
-ii-
121 LOOOl 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010) ...................................................... 20 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (l 964) ................................................................... 8, 9, 12 
Brinkerhoff-Faris TrustandSav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) 
Caltfornia v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 112 I, 1125 (1983 ) ....................................................................... 19 
Carmellv. Texas, 529 U.S. 513. 521-522 (2000) 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1 
Lancaster v. Metrish, 683 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 2012) ............................................................. .IO 
Lovitt v. Robideau,r, 139 Idaho 322 (2003) ................................................................................... 16 
Afarks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 ( 1977) 
1Wissouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) ...................................................................................... 20 
People v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567 (Colo. 201 10, 11, 12, 13 
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) lO 
State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587,591,990 P.2d 753,557 (Ct. App. 1999) .................................. 19 
Statev. Byers, l02Idaho 159, 160-165(1981) ....................................................................... 11, 12 
State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295 (1971 7 
Statev. Doe, 130Idaho811,814,948P.2d 166, 169(Ct.App.1997) ........................................ .18 
State v. Hu[;hes, 130 Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 1997) ........................................... 17 
State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902) .......................................................................................... 12, 14 
State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398,399,941 P.2d 1299, 1300 (1997) ................................................ .19 
-iii-
12l 100()1 
State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003) 11, l3 
State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117-118. 844 P.2d 1364, 1367-1368 (Ct. App. 1992) ............ .19 
State v. Pullos, 76 Idaho 369 (1955) ................................................................................................ 7 
State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820 (Ct. App. 2003) ............................................................................ 7, 12 
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,374 n.8 (2010) ....................................................................... 8 
State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004) .......................................................................................... 12 
State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71 (1968) .................................................................................................. 12 
State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507 (Ct App. l 998) ...................................................................... 6 
State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353 (1957) ........................................................................................... 13 
State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 1997) 
Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 (Ct. App. 2008) .................................................................. 12 
Other Authorities 
Idaho Const. Ast I, § 16 ................................................................................................................ 12 
U.S. CONST amend. V 8. 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20 
U.S. CONST ART. I,§ 1 12 
-iv-
1211.0001 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Jared Hergesheimer was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence ("DUI") 
in magistrate court. Mr. Hergesheimer appealed to the district court, arguing that (1) the 
officers' detention of his person for suspicion of domestic violence was impermissibly extended 
after officers' suspicions were dispelled in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution; (2) Mr. Hergesheimer was 
subjected to an improper custodial interrogation where the officer proceeded to question him 
without a valid waiver of Miranda1 rights; and (3) the court erred in denying his Idaho Criminal 
Rule ("Rule") 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal where the State failed to offer sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti rule to maintain a conviction. The district court affirmed 
the magistrate's order denying Mr. Hergesheimer's motion to suppress and the denial of his Rule 
29 motion. Mr. Hergesheimer timely appeals. 
B. Statement of the Facts and Course Proceedings. 
The basic factual background of this case is not disputed and was set forth in the district 
court's :\1emorandum Decision and Order. 
The Defendant, Jared Hergesheimer (hereafter "Hergesheimer"'), was arrested for 
DUI on September 4, 2011. He brought a Motion to Suppress Evidence on two 
grounds, both of which were denied by the Trial Court. The matter went to jury 
trial on March 20, 20 I 2. Prior to the matter being submitted to the jury 
Hergesheimer made a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29. That motion was denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict at 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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trial. Hergesheimer renewed his Rule 29 motion which was again denied. 
Hergesheimer filed an appeal of those rulings ... 
On or about September 4, 2011, at approximately 2:06 a.m. Boise police officers 
responded to 2401 S. Apple St. in reference to a possible domestic violence call 
received by Ada County dispatch. Officers Roath, Miller, Nielsen, and Brechwald 
responded in two police vehicles. Upon arrival, officers located one vehicle and 
two individuals, a man and a woman. The officers separated the man (later 
identified as Hergesheimer) and the woman. Upon contacting Hergesheimer, 
Officer N[ielsenJ frisked and handcuffed him. Officer N[ielsen] advised 
Hergesheimer that he was not under arrest at that time and read Hergesheimer his 
Miranda rights. When asked if he understood those rights, Hergesheimer 
responded 'Can I have a drink of water?' Officer Nielsen and Hergesheimer then 
proceeded to have a conversation about the circumstances of the domestic 
violence calL During that conversation, Hergesheimer admitted to drinking 
alcohol earlier in the evening. From the initial contact to the end of this 
conversation, approximately nine minutes and thirty seconds (9:30) elapsed. 
During this same time, Officer Roath spoke with the female located on scene. 
Officer Roath learned from the female that she and Hergesheimer had recently 
arrived at that location and that Hergesheimer had been the driver. Officer Roath 
and Nielsen then exchanged information that each had gathered from the two 
parties. This took roughly three minutes (3:00). Both officers agreed that there 
was no evidence or complaint of any physical contact. At approximately thirteen 
minutes and twenty seconds (13:20) from initial contact, Hergesheimer is taken 
out of handcuffs. 2 Officer Roath then began to question Hergesheimer about his 
alcohol consumption and driving. Hergesheimer reiterates how much he has had 
to drink, what he had to drink, when it was consumed, what time he thinks it is, 
where he came from, and admits to driving to that location. Hergesheimer is then 
subject[ed] to Field Sobriety Tests, which he fails. At approximately twenty-six 
minutes and ten seconds (26: I 0) after the initial contact Hergesheimer is placed 
under arrest for Driving Under the Influence. Later he provides two breath 
samples resulting in a BAC [breath alcohol content] of .136 and . I 28. 
Respondent's Brief, at 2. See also Appellant's Brief, at 1. 
(R., pp.252-253.) 
2 Apparently, to perform the field sobriety testing. 
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Mr. Hergesheimer then proceeded to trial. At trial, Officer Roath testified the he was 
dispatched to an apartment complex near Apple Street at approximately 2:06 a.m. (Tr., p.71, 
Ls. l0-19, p.12 L Ls.2-6.) Officer Roath was the second vehicle on the scene and upon arriving, 
observed a male and female standing outside a white Ford Ranger and the male was walking 
away toward the other officers. (Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.3.) Officer Roath spoke with the 
female for several minutes, then moved on to talking to the male. (Tr., p. 72, Ls.4-15.) 
Officer Roath testified that the male, identified as Mr. Hergesheirner, had "slurred speech. odor 
of alcohol emitting from his breath and person. his eyes were glassy and bloodshot.'' (Tr., p.73, 
Ls.15-18.) 
According to Officer Roath, Mr. Hergesheimer "eventually admitted that he drove there;· 
but on cross-examination, Officer Roath acknowledged that Mr. Hergesheimer never verbally 
responded to his question as to whether he drove to the apartment complex. (Tr., p.74, Ls.18-21, 
p.l 23, Ls.l -12.) Officer Roath admitted that he did not search the white truck, did not 
fingerprint the steering wheel or door handle, did not check the hood to see if it was warm, and 
did not contact the person who called 911. (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-23.) 
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel for Mr. Hergesheimer made a Rule 29 
motion for a judgment of acquittal. Relying on the Court of Appeals decision in State v. 
Suriner,3 counsel argued that the State failed to offer evidence to corroborate 
Mr. Hergesheimer's purported admission that he had been driving that morning. (Tr., p.140, 
3 State v. Suriner, 2011 Ida. App. Lexis 79 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
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L.22 - p.144, magistrate held that the corroboration was that Mr. Hergesheimer 
admitted they were coming to get his truck, so he admitted o\\nership of the truck, and that 
satisfied the corpus delicti rule. (Tr., p.150, L.24 - p.151, L.23.) The jury subsequently found 
Mr. Hergesheimer guilty of DUI. (R., pp.119.) 
Following the jury verdict, the magistrate imposed a Withheld Judgment and placed 
Mr. Hergesheimer on unsupervised probation. (R., p.120.) Mr. Hergesheimer filed a Notice of 
Appeal to the district court. (R., pp.123-125.) On appeal to the district court, Mr. Hergesheimer 
asserted: (1) the officers impermissibly extended Mr. Hergesheimer' s detention after officers' 
suspicions about domestic violence were dispelled; (2) Mr. Hergesheimer was subjected to an 
improper custodial interrogation where the officer proceeded to question him without a valid 
waiver of Miranda rights: and (3) the court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for a judgment 
of acquittal where the State failed to offer any evidence to corroborate his purported confession. 
(R., pp.163-191, 226-243.) The district court affirmed the magistrate's order denying 
Mr. Hergesheimer's motion to suppress and the denial of his Rule 29 motion. (R., pp.252-259.) 
The district court held that the seizure was not unreasonably extended because the officer 
became aware that Mr. Hergesheimer had been drinking, was under age, and might have driven 
to the scene. (R., pp.258-261.) With regard to Mr. Hergesheimer's Miranda claim, the district 
court concluded that Mr. Hergesheimer was not in custody and even if he was in custody, he was 
given Miranda warning and validly waived them by answering the officer's questions. 
(R., pp.263-266.) In affirming the denial of Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 motion, the district 
court concluded Mr. Hergesheimer·s purported admission was corroborated because the jury 
-4-
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Officer Roath's audio where Mr. Hergesheimer's girlfriend, Chelsey, was questioned and 
admitted to the officer that Mr. Hergesheimer had driven to the apartment complex. (R., pp.266-
169.) Mr. Hergesheimer filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's Memorandum 




Did the Magistrate err when it denied Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 motion seeking a 
judgment of acquittal because the State presented insufficient evidence to establish the 
corpus deliciti independent of Mr. Hergesheimer's admission? 
Did the Magistrate err in denying Mr. Hergesheimer's Motion to Suppress statements 
obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Magistrate Erred When It Denied Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 Motion Seeking 
A Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To 
Establish The Corpus Deliciti Of The Chan:;ed Offense Independent Of 
Mr. Hergesheimer's Admission. 
Introduction. 
At the conclusion of the State's evidence, defense counsel made a Rule 29 motion for 
judgment of acquittal arguing that although Mr. Hergesheimer purportedly "nodded" when asked 
if he drove to the scene, the jury was without any other evidence to corroborate the corpus delicti 
rule, which was the law at the time of Mr. Hergesheimer's trial. The magistrate denied 
Mr. Hergesheimer's motion. On appeal, Mr. Hergesheimer asserts that the magistrate erred in 
-5-
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denying his Rule 29 motion and district court improperly relied on evidence not offered to 
the jury in affirming the magistrate's decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion seeking a judgment of 
acquittal, this Court will not reverse a verdict on such grounds where every element of the 
offense is established by substantial and competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Willard, 129 
Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1997). All of the inferences from the evidence are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State. Id. 
This Court will likewise not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of the 
evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its O'wn view of the evidence for that of 
the jury. See, e.g., State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1998). Further, matters 
regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences 
to be dra½TI therefrom are solely within the province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be 
reversed, however, if the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 
130 Idaho 698, 701 (Ct. App. 1997). 
C. The Magistrate Erred When It Denied Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 Motion Seeking 
A Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To 
Establish The Corpus Deliciti Of The Charged Offense Independent Of 
Mr. Hergesheimer's Admission. 
"A plea of not guilty puts in issue every material allegation of the indictment." State v. 
Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 296 (1971). One of the material allegations that is placed at issue in every 
-6-
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criminal offense is the corpus delicti the charged offense. Id.: State v. Pullos, 76 Idaho 369, 
373-374 (1955). The prosecution has the burden of proof of the corpus delicti. Id. 
"Corpus delicti, meaning, 'the body of a crime,' is a common law principle that requires 
the state to establish some evidence that a crime occurred independently from a defendant's 
confession." State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820, 822 (Ct. App. 2003). The corpus delicti rule "is the 
fact that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by the extrajudicial confessions or 
statements of the prisoner, and that there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances 
tending to show that a crime has been committed, aside from such confessions and statements." 
State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81, 83 (2013) (quoting State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 704 (1902).) This 
principle applies both to a defendant's extrajudicial admissions, as well as extrajudicial 
confessions. Roth, 138 Idaho at 823 n. 2. Id. Only slight corroboration by independent 
evidence is required. Id. 
1. It Would Violate Constitutional Principles Of Due Process To Apply The 
Elimination Of The Corpus Delicti Requirement From The Opinion In 
Suriner To Mr. Hergesheimer's Case. 
It is well established that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 
precludes a legislative enactment from being applied retroactively to a criminal defendant where 
that action, among other things, operates so as to alter the legal rules of evidence so as to receive 
different or less testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the alleged 
offense. See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-522 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 
U.S. 37, 41-42 (1990). Although the Ex Post Facto clauses of the State and federal constitutions 
apply by their terms only to legislative enactments and provisions, the Fifth Amendment of the 
-7-
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United States Constitution provides similar protections with regard to judicial actions that 
operate in a similar manner. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977). This due 
process protection emanates from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and ''is 
based on the notion that persons have the right to fair warning of that conduct which will give 
rise to criminal penalties." Id.; see also State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374 n.8 (2010). 
The United States Supreme Court made this clear in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 
347 (1964). In Bouie, the Court held that, "[t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right 
of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable 
and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language." Bouie, 378 U.S. at 
352. The Bouie Court further expanded on the nature of such a due process violation when a 
reviewing court unexpectedly alters the common law to a defendant's detriment: 
Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied 
retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § l 0, of 
the Constitution forbids. An ex post facto law has been defined by this Court as 
one "that makes an action done before the passing of the law. and which was 
innocent when done, criminal; and which punishes such action'' or "that 
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed." If a state 
legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must 
follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from 
achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental 
principle that "the required criminal law must have existed when the crime 
occurred" must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating 
from courts as well as from legislatures. If a judicial construction of a criminal 
statute is "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been 
expressed prior to the conduct in issue/' it must not be given retroactive effect. 
Id. at 353-354 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
-8-
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Subsequent to Bouie. the United States Supreme Court recognized that this due process 
protection extends not only to judicial interpretations of statutes, but also to judicial alterations of 
protections that existed only at common law. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 45 l (2001 ). 
The Court in Rogers held that a judicial alteration of the prior existing common law cannot be 
retroactively applied under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment where that alteration 
is "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the 
conduct at issue." Id. at 462. In making this determination, the Rogers Court looked to factors 
such as whether the common law at issue retained current justification for its on-going existence, 
whether it had been given meaningful effect in prior decisions (as opposed to being mentioned in 
passing and as dicta), whether the common law rule involved a substantive right, and whether the 
alteration of the reviewing court was consistent with the actions undertaken in other jurisdictions. 
Id. at 462-467. 
Although the standard articulated in Rogers with regard to when a due process violation 
is established is broad in its sweep, the prior Opinion in Bouie which formed the basis for the 
Rogers Opinion provides clearer guidance. In Bouie, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that, 
"[w]hen a state court overrules a consistent line of procedural decisions with the retroactive 
effect of denying a litigant a hearing in a pending case, it thereby deprive him of due process of 
law 'in its primary sense of an opportunity to be heard and to defend (his) substantive right.'" 
Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 (quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 
(1930)) ( emphasis added). In other words, where there is an established line of case law wherein 
a substantive right has been recognized by the courts, an abrupt departure from this consistent set 
-9-
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holdings cannot be retroactively applied to a criminal defendant under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. See Lancaster v. Metrish, 683 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 2012). 
It was this standard that led the Supreme Court of Colorado to conclude that its judicial 
abrogation of the corpus delicti requirement could not be applied retroactively under due process 
principles. In People v. LaRosa, the Supreme Court of Colorado had occasion to revisit the on-
going viability of the corpus delicti rule in the context of a case where the only corroboration of 
a defendant's confession of sexual assault was the opportunity for the defendant to have 
committed the offense. People v. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 570-579 (Colo. 2013). After a 
discussion of the roots of the corpus delicti rule under the Colorado common law, the Colorado 
Supreme Court ultimately abandoned this rule in favor of a more general trustworthiness 
standard. Id. However, this did not end the discussion regarding the disposition of the LaRosa 
case: the Colorado Supreme Court still had to resolve whether this alteration could be applied 
retroactively under the Due Process Clause. 
The LaRosa Court determined that it could not. [n LaRosa, the Court first distinguished 
the abolition of the corpus delicti rule from the common law rule at issue in the Rogers Opinion. 
LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578-579. In particular, the LaRosa Court noted that the common law rule at 
issue in Rogers was characterized as a "substantive principle" of law, '''in name only' because it 
had never been enforced" in any state court decision, and "had never served as a ground of 
decision in any homicide prosecution in the State and had only been mentioned in three cases, 
each time in dicta." Id. at 579 (quoting Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464). Although recognizing that the 
corpus delicti rule had been subject to some criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless 
-10-
l2l !.000! 
recognized that the rule had been in actual force several jurisdictions, including the court's 
own prior decisions. Id. In fact, the LaRosa Court noted that the corpus delicti rule had been the 
substantive law in Colorado for over one hundred years. Id. Accordingly, because overturning 
this rule was a clear, and therefore unexpected, break from well-established case law, the Court 
in LaRosa held that it would violate due process to apply the elimination of this rule to those 
whose convictions arose prior to its decision. As such. the Court in LaRosa reversed the 
defendant's conviction. Id. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has also held that it would be unconstitutional to 
apply the elimination of its common law corpus delicti rule retroactively to those whose offenses 
arose prior to the court's decision. See State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003). Moreover, 
the conclusion that the elimination of the corpus delicti rule cannot be retroactively applied is 
consistent with prior decisions from the Supreme Court of Idaho in a related context. 
In State v. Byers, the Idaho Supreme Court eliminated the common law requirement of 
corroboration of an alleged victim's allegation of rape in prosecutions for this offense. State v. 
Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 160-165 (1981 ). However, in doing so the Court recognized that it was 
altering the quantum of proof required in order to establish this offense. Id. at 165-167. In light 
of this, the Byers Court held that the corroboration rule must be followed with regard to the 
defendant in that case, along with those who were tried prior to the issuance of the Court's 
opinion. Id. 
The Court in Byers so held because, "[t]o apply today's decision in passing on the 
validity of Byers' conviction would be the equivalent of applying an ex post facto law, and is 
-11-
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within the prohibitions of Article I, § 10 the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 16 of our 
Idaho Constitution." Id. at I 66. The Byers Court recognized that the elimination of the 
corroboration requirement, ·'alters the rules of evidence such that "less or different testimony 
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense (is necessary) in order to 
convict the offender."' Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354) (alterations in the original). In light 
of this, the Byers Court held that the newly announced rule eliminating the corroboration 
requirement, "is to be applied prospectively to criminal trials commenced hereafter." Id. at 167. 
As with Byers, Idaho courts prior to Suriner had consistently recognized the corpus 
delicti rule in Idaho - dating back over one hundred years to its adoption in State v. Keller in 
1902. See. e.g., State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004); State v. Urie. 92 Idaho 71 (1968); State 
v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902); State v. Roth, l 38 Idaho 820 (Ct. App. 2003). And, like LaRosa, 
this rule was not one that had never had substantive force in Idaho the requirements of corpus 
delicti were unequivocally recognized as part of the State's burden of proof of the charged 
offense at triaL See, e.g. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 (Ct App. 2008); Roth, 138 Idaho 
at 822. 
Moreover, the elimination of the corpus delicti rule in Idaho under Suriner is particularly 
unexpected, given that the Idaho Supreme Court has left no standard of corroboration in its wake 
in order for a conviction to be sustained on the basis of a confession alone. In eliminating the 
corpus delicti rule in Idaho, the Suriner Court held that: 
12! 10001 
Because the harm caused by the rule exceeds whatever benefits there may be, we 
hold that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies in Idaho. We see no reason to 
attempt to fashion another rule to take its place. Instead, the jury can give a 
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defendant's extrajudicial confession or statement whatever weight it deems 
appropriate along with all of the other evidence when deciding whether the State 
has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Suriner, 154 Idaho at 88 (emphasis added). 
This represents a drastic departure, not only from over a hundred years of prior 
established jurisprudence in Idaho, but with the general requirements for admission of or use of a 
confession in order to establish guilt throughout the country. '·Courts adhere almost universally 
to the principle that ·an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction 
for a crime.''' 1i'fauchley, 67 P.3d 477,481 (quoting State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353,354 (1957)) 
(emphasis added). This nearly universal requirement of additional corroboration was further 
reflected in LaRosa, wherein the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that, "[a)lmost all 
courts adhere to a corroboration requirement. which requires the prosecution to present 
corroborating evidence of a defendant's confession to either allow for its admission into 
evidence or sustain a conviction. LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567,571 (emphasis added). 
Although the modem trend has been to adopt a general trustworthiness standard with 
regard to the admission and use of criminal confessions, the fact remains that some requirement 
of corroboration remains in nearly all jurisdictions with regard to a defendant's confessions. 
Accordingly, the Opinion in Suriner also represents a departure from the case law in nearly all 
jurisdictions in that there is now no standard that has supplanted corpus delicti ensuring the 
reliability and factual corroboration of a criminal confession -- or its use as the sole proof of guilt 
in a criminal ca5e. 
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Finally, a clear indication that the elimination corpus delicti in Idaho should not be 
retroactively applied comes from the Suriner Court itself. [n the Suriner Opinion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not apply its decision to eliminate the corpus delicti rule to the defendant's 
own case rather, the Court first analyzed whether the traditional legal standards of corpus 
delicti had been met in the defendant's case before proceeding to eliminate the rule. Suriner, 154 
Idaho at I 095-1098. Had the rule eliminating corpus delicti been intended to apply retroactively, 
the Suriner Court would have applied it in Mr. Suriner's case, and would not have applied the 
prior rule in that case. Based upon the Suriner Court's implicit decision not to do so, this 
indicates that the elimination of the corpus delicti rule was not intended to operate retroactively. 
2. Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 Motion Should Have Been Granted Where The 
State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish The Corpus Deliciti Of 
The Charged Offense Independent Of Mr. Hergesheimer's Admission. 
As is set forth above, The corpus delicti rule "is the fact that a crime has been committed 
cannot be proved by the extrajudicial confessions or statements of the prisoner, and that there 
must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show that a crime has been 
committed, aside from such confessions and statements." Suriner, I 54 Idaho at 83 ( quoting 
Keller. 8 Idaho at 704.) In the instant case, at trial the jury heard evidence that Officer Roath's 
vehicle was the second on the scene and he observed a male and female standing outside a white 
Ford Ranger (Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.3.) Officer Roath testified that after talking with the 
female, he moved on to the male who had '"slurred speech, odor of alcohol emitting from his 
breath and person, his eyes were glassy and bloodshot." (Tr., p.73, Ls.15-18.) \Vhen the male 
was asked if he drove there, he purportedly nodded, but the contact was not videotaped. (Tr., 
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p.74, 18-21, p. l Ls.l-1 Officer Roath admitted that he did not search the white truck, 
did not fingerprint the steering wheel or door handle, did not check the hood to see if it was 
warm, and did not contact the person that called 91 L (Tr., p.125, Ls.2-23.) Thus, the only 
evidence the jury heard was that Mr. Hergesheimer had consumed alcohol and according to the 
breathalyzer, was intoxicated. The jury was never allowed to consider any evidence that 
Mr. Hergesheimer had been drinking and driving, as required for a conviction under. LC. § I 8-
8004. As such, Mr. Hergesheimer's purported admission that he was driving on the morning in 
question was not corroborated as required by the corpus delicti rule. 
The magistrate concluded that Mr. Hergesheimer's admission that he was dropped off at 
the apartment complex "where my car was," was sufficient corroboration. (Tr., p.150. L.24 -
p.151, L.23.) However, that conclusion suffers from two fatal flaws. First, merely because 
Mr. Hergesheimer's car might have been there, it does not comport that he had been driving it, 
especially considering the absence of testimony about who had any keys to the truck. Secondly, 
and more importantly, as was noted by the Court in Suriner, the corpus delicti rule requires that, 
"'there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show that a crime has 
been committed, aside from such confessions or statements." Id. ( emphasis added). While 
multiple confessions to third parties may suffice for this rule, using the confession itself to 
"corroborate" the confession does not. Id. at 1095-1098. 
On intermediate appeal to the district court, the district court concluded 
Mr. Hergesheimer's purported admission was corroborated because the jury heard 
Officer Roath's audio where Mr. Hergesheimer's girlfriend, Chelsey was questioned and 
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admitted to the officer that Mr. Hergesheimer had driven to the apartment complex. (R., pp.266-
169.) The district court's finding/conclusion is clearly erroneous. ''To decide whether findings 
of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court must determine whether the findings are supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier of 
fact would accept it and rely on it." Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003). While the 
district court was correct that the jury did hear from an audio recorded by Officer Roath, the 
version the jury heard was an abbreviated audio recording that did not include Officer Roath's 
conversation with Chelsey. (Compare, State's Trial Exhibit 001 with State's Motion to Suppress 
Exhibit 001 ). As such, the jury never heard any of Officer Roath's conversation with Chelsey 
and the district court erred in relying on said "evidence" to affirm the denial of 
Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 motion. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hergesheimer's Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal should have 
been granted where the State failed to offer any evidence to corroborate his alleged admission to 
driving to the apartment complex after consuming alcohol. 
IL 
The Magistrate Erred In Denying Mr. Hergesheimer's Motion To Suppress Statements 
Obtained In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights. 
A. Introduction. 
Mr. Hergesheimer seeks suppression of those statements made during custodial 
interrogation after Miranda warnings were given. The statements allegedly made by 
Mr. Hergesehimer, during custodial interrogation in the presence of four armed officers, and 
prior to Aliranda warnings, should have been suppressed as they were obtained in violation of his 
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Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as his any purported waiver was not knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary. 
B. The Magistrate Erred In Denying Mr. Hergesheimer's Motion To Suppress 
Statements Obtained In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights. 
Mr. Hergesheimer asserts that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion to 
suppress statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. "The standard of review of a suppression 
motion is bifurcated." State v. Hughes, 134 Idaho 81 I, 813, 10 P.3d 760, 762 (Ct. App. 2000). 
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate courts accept the district 
court's findings of fact that were supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. Id. 
In his suppression motion, and accompanying brief in support, Mr. Hergesheimer argued 
that even though the officer advised Mr. Hergesheimer of his rights, "he did so in a fashion as to 
totally gut the importance of those rights and he never confirmed that Mr. Hergesheimer 
understood those rights." (R., pp.47-48.) Following a hearing on the motion, the district court 
entered an oral finding denying Mr. Hergesheimer's motion to suppress. (Tr., p.65, L. 13 - p.66, 
L.24.) The district court found that Mr. Hergesheimer was not in custody, so Miranda was not 
needed, and even if needed, the fact that Mr. Hergesheimer failed to given an affirmative 
response to understanding Miranda, and that he went on to answer questions is sufficient for a 
waiver. (Tr .. p.66, Ls.12-13.) Mr. Hergesheimer contends that the district court erred in denying 
his suppression motion because his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was 
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,uw,,...,..., he was questioned while in custody, prior to understanding of the importance of the 
Miranda rights and a valid waiver under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a defendant 
has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST amend. V. A defendant's 
Fifth Amendment rights must be explained to him before custodial interrogation may begin. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to Miranda: 
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by 
the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege 
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be 
employed to protect the privilege. and unless other fully effective means are 
adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure the exercise of the 
right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must 
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to 
the presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
Id. at 464. 
1. Mr. Hergesheimer Was In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda. 
Both the magistrate and the district court erred in determining that Mr. Hergesheimer was 
not custody for purposes of Miranda. 
The requirement of Afiranda warnings is operative whenever a person is interrogated 
while they are in "custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.'' Miranda, 384 at 444 (emphasis added); State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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If a person is not Mirandized before answering a question in a custodial interrogation, the 
statement is inadmissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492-94. 
A person is in custody for purposes of the Miranda requirement when there is a formal 
arrest, or when there is a restraint on the freedom of a person's movement to such a degree that is 
associated with a formal arrest, or that person's freedom of action is significantly deprived. 
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398,399 (1997). 
In determining whether a person is in custody, the relevant question is how a reasonable person 
in the defendant's position would have understood his situation. State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 
587, 591 (Ct. App. 1999). ''The totality of the circumstances must be examined, which may 
include the location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the 
questioning, the time of the interrogation, and other persons present." Id (citing State v. 
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117-118 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
Here, Mr. Hergesheimer was approached by four uniformed, armed officers with their 
police car lights on at 2:06 a.m. (Tr., p.7, L.13 p.9, 14.) \Vhen the first officer arrived, 
Officer Nielson, Mr. Hergesheimer was walking in the opposite direction and Mr. Hergesheimer 
was ordered to tum around and walk back to him. (Tr., p.38, L.7 - p.40, L.8.) Officer Nielson, 
who is 6'6 and 280 pounds, ordered Mr. Hergesheimer to take his hands out of his pockets. 
(Tr., p.38, L.7 - p.40, L.15.) Mr. Hergesheimer was immediately handcuffed and patted down. 
(Tr., p.30, Ls.5-16.) Despite Mr. Hergesheimer' s subjective belief and the circumstances, 
Officer Nielson told Mr. Hergesheimer he was not under arrest, "to keep a very calm repoire.'' 
(Tr., p.31, Ls.10-21.) 
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Mr. Hergesheimer's freedom of movement was completely deprived, he was handcuffed 
and surrounded by four much larger, armed officers that dictated his every movement Despite 
the officers intended attempts to calm Mr. Hergesheimer by informing him that he was not under 
arrest, a reasonable person whose freedom of movement was completely restrained would feel 
though they were in police custody. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in determining that 
Mr. Hergesheimer was not in custody for purposes of Afiranda. 
2. Mr. Hergesheimer Was Not Properly Informed Of His Rights And His 
Statements Were Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntan'. 
Miranda set forth the black letter rule that if a person is not advised of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self incrimination before answering a question in a custodial 
interrogation, the statement is inadmissible. Afiranda, 384 U.S. at 492-94. Likewise, in 
Missouri v. Seibert.4 the United States Supreme Court observed, "Miranda conditioned the 
admissibility oat trial of any custodial confession on warning a suspect of his rights: failure to 
give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally 
requires exclusion of any statements obtained." Id. 542 U.S. at 608. Mr. Hergesheimer 
acknowledges Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010), which stands 
for the proposition that a criminal suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent. 
Id However, Mr. Hergesheimer's case is distinguishable based on the facts and officers actions 
in the case. Prior to reading Mr. Hergesheimer his Miranda rights, Officer Nielson infonned 
Mr. Hergesheimer he was only reading him his rights "so it will be like we are on a TV show, 
4 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
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you know what a mean?" (State's Motion to Suppress Exhibit 003, Time Stamp 3:03; State's 
Motion to Suppress Exhibit 002, Time Stamp 1 :25.) Mr. Hergesheimer's only response to the 
"Miranda" reading was to ask for a glass of water. (State's Motion to Suppress Exhibit 003, 
Time Stamp 3:03; State's Motion to Suppress Exhibit 002, Time Stamp 1 :25.) The Officers 
attempt at levity has the effect of informing Mr. Hergesheimer of his rights, but telling him that 
they are not important. This, combined with his lack of a formal understanding or response and 
his inexperience with law enforcement, resulted in an inadequate and involuntary waiver of 
Miranda. 
Accordingly, all statements made by Mr. Hergesheimer after he was taken into custody 
and interrogated should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hergesheimer respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for DUI. 
Alternatively, Mr. Hergesheimer asks that this Court reverse the magistrate's denial of his 
Motion to Suppress and remand his case to the magistrate for a new trial with instructions that all 
statements made by Mr. Hergesheimer after he was in custody and questions be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of March, 2014. 
BRADY LAW, CHARTERED 
Eric D. Fredlricksen 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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